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Abstract— Europe is currently struggling to 
implement coherent coexistence regulations on 
genetically modified (GM) and non-GM crops in all EU 
Member States. We conduct simulations with the 
software ArcView® on a GIS dataset of a hypothetical 
case of GM herbicide tolerant oilseed rape cultivation in 
Central France. Our findings show that rigid coexistence 
rules, such as large distance requirements, may impose a 
severe burden on GM crop production in Europe. These 
rules are not proportional to the farmers’ basic 
incentives for coexistence and hence not consistent with 
the objectives of the European Commission. More 
alarming, we show that in densely planted areas a 
domino-effect may occur. This effect raises coexistence 
costs and even adds to the non-proportionality of rigid 
coexistence regulations. Instead, we show that flexible 
measures would be preferable since they are 
proportional to the incentives for coexistence and, hence, 
less counterproductive for European agriculture. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Europe is currently struggling to implement 
coherent coexistence regulations on genetically 
modified (GM) and non-GM crops in all EU Member 
States. According to the European Commission’s (EC) 
guidelines, “Coexistence refers to the ability of 
farmers to make a practical choice between 
conventional, organic and GM [genetically modified] 
crop production, in compliance with the legal 
obligations for labelling and/or purity standards. The 
adventitious presence of GMOs [genetically modified 
organisms] above the tolerance threshold set out in 
Community legislation triggers the need for a crop that 
was intended to be a non-GMO crop, to be labelled as 
containing GMOs. This could cause a loss of income, 
due to a lower market price of the crop or difficulties 
in selling it. […] Coexistence is, therefore, concerned 
with the potential economic impact of the admixture 
of GM and non-GM crops [...]” [1]. Since the 
publication of these guidelines, some Member States 
have developed, and others are still developing, a 
diversity of ex ante regulations and ex post liability 
rules on the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops [2]. 
In this article, our attention is drawn to the first 
group of ex ante regulations, and more specifically to 
spatial coexistence regulations. Our concern is that 
rigid rules, such as large distance requirements [2], 
may impose a severe burden on GM crop production 
and may not be proportional to farmers’ basic 
incentives for coexistence. This information is 
extremely important and timely for EU policy makers 
who are currently facing the challenge of 
implementing coherent coexistence regulations 
tailored to a heterogeneous landscape of European 
agriculture. Since the publication of the European 
Commission’s first report on coexistence [3], the 
debate has been centred on the potential costs of 
coexistence of GM and non-GM crops, but very few 
studies have focused on the ‘incentives’ for 
coexistence, i.e. (i) GM crop cultivation (in order to 
capture ‘GM rents’) versus (ii) identity preservation 
(IP) of non-GM crops (in order to capture ‘IP rents’). 
Both incentives play a crucial role: if one of them is 
lacking, there is no coexistence problem, stricto sensu. 
Finally, in the literature spatial coexistence of GM and 
non-GM crops is often regarded as a technical 
challenge, depending on spatial pollen dispersal and 
cross pollination [4,5,6], temporal and spatial 
distribution and interaction of crops [7,8,9], separation 
distances [9,10] and practical measures [11,12,13], but 
the interplay between incentives and costs of 
coexistence is poorly studied. Therefore, in this article 
we develop a modelling framework for simulating 
spatial coexistence measures and estimating the costs 
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of these measures, which explicitly takes into account 
the incentives for coexistence.  
This article is organized as follows. After this 
introduction, in Section 2 we derive a simple model 
for analyzing the economics of spatial coexistence. In 
Section 3, we link this model to a GIS (Geographic 
Information System) modelling framework and apply 
it to a sampled area in Central France. Section 4 
presents the data. In Section 5 we present the results 
generated by our modelling framework for a set of 
simulations of realistic coexistence scenarios. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
II. ECONOMICS OF SPATIAL COEXISTENCE  
Most EU Member States’ spatial coexistence 
legislations include (i) minimal isolation distance 
requirements, implemented by 10 Member States, in 
combination with or as an alternative to (ii) buffer 
zones planted with non-GM crops of the same species 
between GM and non-GM fields, implemented by six 
Member States [2]. In this article, we polarize the 
latter two types of spatial coexistence regulations to 
draw policy recommendations. We model the example 
of large isolation distances and assume rigidity, i.e. the 
regulations are imposed on GM farmers, regardless of 
local agreements between neighbouring farmers. We 
further assume that fields which are too close to fields 
planted with non-GM crops cannot be planted with 
GM varieties of the same crop species. We define 
buffer zones as cross-pollination zones between two 
farmers growing two different varieties (GM and non-
GM) of the same crop. These zones are planted with 
non-GM crops and sold as GM. We model the 
example of narrow buffer zones and assume 
flexibility, i.e. regulations allow buffer zones to be 
negotiated and planted by GM as well as non-GM 
farmers. 
In the case of rigid coexistence rules, such as 
isolation distances imposed on GM crop farmers, if a 
field is too close to a non-GM field of a particular 
crop, the field has to be planted with other crops or 
non-GM varieties of the same crop species. A rational 
farmer who foregoes the GM rent will attempt to 
compensate this loss by attempting to capture the IP 
rent. The resulting costs are a trade-off between the 
GM rent (yield boost and cost reduction) and the IP 
rent (price premium): 
Cid = aid (β yc Pg + ΔC – yc Pg μ),     (1) 
where aid represents the total area of GM-free fields of 
a particular crop to respect a certain isolation distance, 
β = (yg – yc)/yc the proportionate yield boost of the GM 
crop (yg) relative to the conventional one (yc), ΔC = cc 
– cg the per-hectare cost reduction generated by the 
GM crop (cg) relative to the conventional one (cc), and 
μ = (Pn – Pg)/ Pg the price premium factor of IP crops  
relative to GM crops. 
In the case of flexible coexistence regulations, we 
consider four practical solutions, depending on 
whether the buffer zone is cultivated on the GM field 
(System 1) or on the non-GM field (System 2) and 
whether it is planted and cultivated by the owner 
(System a) or the neighbour (System b) of the field. In 
System 1a, the GM farmer plants and cultivates a 
buffer zone with non-GM crops on his GM field next 
to his neighbour’s non-GM field. However, in the 
context of herbicide tolerant (HT) crops, maintaining 
two different weed control systems on a single field 
may not be practical for organizational reasons. 
Therefore, in System 1b it is the non-GM farmer who 
plants and cultivates a buffer zone on the GM farmer’s 
field. The latter reimburses part of the former’s 
cultivation costs (sowing and herbicide treatments) 
and harvests his entire field, including the buffer zone. 
In either system, the GM farmer foregoes the GM rent 
on his buffer zone: 
Cbz = abz (β yc Pg + ΔC),      (2) 
where aid represents the total area of the buffer zone. 
In System 2a, the non-GM farmer separately 
harvests his adjacent margins, which serve as buffer 
zones, next to the neighbouring farmer’s GM fields, 
and delivers them to the collector as ‘GM’. However, 
he foregoes any scale economies of harvesting and 
selling his full non-GM crop production in a single lot, 
such as in System 1b. Therefore, a variant which takes 
advantage of scale economies is System 2b: the GM 
farmer first harvests the field margin on the non-GM 
farmer’s field (with a clean harvester to avoid 
contamination of subsequent crop rotations) and sells 
the harvested crops as ‘GM’. In either system, the GM 
farmer has to compensate the neighbouring non-GM 
farmer for the IP rent foregone: 
Cbz = abz yc Pg μ .     (3) 
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Equations 1, 2 and 3 clearly illustrate that the costs 
of spatial coexistence measures are a function of the 
incentives for coexistence, i.e. the GM rent and the IP 
rent. 
In System b, there is a market price risk which can 
be borne by either the GM or the non-GM farmer, 
depending on the contract between both parties. 
Moreover, the system introduces transaction costs due 
to moral hazard [e.g., see 14]. In System 2b, the GM 
farmer has incentives for underreporting yields of non-
GM crops on his neighbour’s field. In System 1b, the 
GM farmer pays the non-GM farmer for his 
cultivation services, but since the latter is not the 
residual claimant of the buffer crops, he has incentives 
to lower the quality of his services. System a avoids 
these transaction costs, but introduces loss of scale 
economies. In System 1a, the GM farmer has to 
manage two different weed management systems on 
his field and in System 2a, the non-GM farmer has to 
separately sell limited quantities of potentially 
contaminated non-GM crops to GM-labelled outlets. 
As a result, the dominance of one of the four systems 
will depend on the trade-off of (i) market price risks, 
(ii) moral hazard and (iii) loss of scale economies. 
III. ARCVIEW® MODELING  
We use the hypothetical example of HT oilseed rape 
adoption in Central France to compare the costs of 
rigid versus flexible coexistence regulations. As a case 
study, the Beauce Blésoise region in Central France 
was chosen. We select a sample square of about 100 
km² centred around the silo of Selommes (Loir-et-
Cher), i.e. 10,000 ha or about 6% of the case study 
region (159,505 ha) and conduct simulations through 
the software ArcView® on a GIS dataset of this 
sample square [15]. We start from a GIS shapefile 
where the arable fields are represented as polygons 
(Figure 1). The modelled landscape counts 1,508 
arable fields covering an area of 4,233 ha.  
Next, through a constrained randomization process, 
we randomly allocate oilseed rape fields in the 
landscape independently of farmers’ land tenure and 
randomly allocate GM traits among the oilseed rape 
fields (Figure 1), subject to different scenarios of 
oilseed rape planting density and GM trait adoption. 
We furthermore assume that farmers plant the fields 
with pure seeds, i.e. free from GM contamination. In 
the benchmark scenario, oilseed rape is randomly 
allocated on 13% of the field area, i.e. the average 
regional planting density, 50% of which is planted 
with GM traits. The latter assumption generates the 
most stringent situation for coexistence because it 
maximizes the probability of a GM field being close to 
a non-GM field. 
 
Fig. 1 GIS shapefile of the sample square in Selommes (Loir-et-
Cher). The figure represents a random draw of the benchmark 
scenario (oilseed rape planting density of 13% and GM adoption 
of 50%). Arable fields are dotted, non-GM oilseed rape fields grey 
and GM oilseed rape fields black. 
In their study on pollen-mediated gene flow from 
HT OSR, Damgaard and Kjellsson [5] observe that 
isolation distances of 50 m between GM and non-GM 
OSR fields should be sufficient to achieve a cross-
fertilization rate of 0.3%. In contrast, Hüsken and 
Dietz-Pfeilstetter [16] review 16 studies and conclude 
that 10 m buffer zones achieve a similar rate of 0.5%. 
Both rates largely fulfil the 0.9% threshold condition 
set by the EU labelling legislation and suggest that 
buffer zones are more spatially efficient than isolation 
distances with regard to minimizing cross-pollination 
[17]. Based on this empirical evidence and including a 
political safety factor, we introduce a GIS dataset of 
the sample square [15] in ArcView® and model (i) 
flexible segregation measures by designing buffer 
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zones of 10-20 m on GM (System 1) or non-GM 
(System 2) field polygons, and (ii) rigid coexistence 
regulations by imposing 50-100 m isolation distances 
between GM and non-GM fields. To illustrate the 
main point of this article, we model both measures as 
polar components of a coexistence regulation. Buffer 
zones are modelled as ‘flexible’ in that they are only 
planted between neighbouring GM and non-GM fields 
so as to respect 10-20 m distance requirements, while 
isolation distances are modelled as ‘rigid’ as they are 
imposed on all GM fields.  
Relative to the benchmark scenario (scenario 1), we 
simulate six additional alternative scenarios by 
varying (i) the adoption rate (scenarios 2 and 3), (ii) 
the share of oilseed rape in the total arable area 
(scenarios 4, 5 and 7), in order to capture regional 
heterogeneity of oilseed rape plantings, and (iii) the 
distance requirement (scenarios 6 and 7), in order to 
capture regional heterogeneity of pollen dispersal. We 
recalculate the seven scenarios under three different IP 
price premium factors, i.e. μ = 3%, 6%, and 12%, and 
three different GM seed price premiums, i.e. €12/ha, 
€23/ha, and €35/ha (cfr.  infra), generating 77 
combinations of coexistence scenarios (cfr. Table 1 
and Table 2). We perform 10 iterations  for each of the 
scenarios and calculate the averages of the total area 
planted by GM and non-GM oilseed rape fields and 
the total area covered by buffer zones (parameter abz in 
equations 2 and 3) and GM-free oilseed rape fields 
(parameter aid in equation 1). 
Farmers capture GM rents by reducing weed control 
costs by planting HT oilseed rape and replacing their 
current conventional herbicide programs by 
glyphosate treatments. The net average cost saving 
engendered by the adoption of GM oilseed rape in the 
case study region, or the ‘GM rent’, has been 
estimated at about €56/ha [18]. Finally, to obtain a 
preliminary idea regarding the potential price premium 
of IP oilseed rape, we observe prices in a comparable 
market, i.e. the market for imported GM and IP 
soybeans for animal feed in the EU. In 2005, IP 
soybeans were sold at a price premium of €12/t or 6% 
of the GM market price [19]. Therefore, at an IP 
premium of 6% and an average yield of 3.13 tons/ha 
recorded in the case study region during the period 
2001-2004 [20], the IP rent of oilseed rape in our 
benchmark scenario is estimated at €42/ha. 
IV. RESULTS  
In Table 1, the ‘Phase 1’ rows report the ‘static’ 
coexistence management costs, expressed per hectare 
of GM oilseed rape, entailed by rigid coexistence 
regulations, such as isolation distances of 50 m 
(scenarios 1-5) and 100 m (scenarios 6-7) imposed on 
potential adopters. These costs represent the static 
opportunity costs for adopters that arise as a 
consequence of complying with official distance 
requirements (equation 1). The observed static costs 
amount to about €4/ha in our benchmark scenario and 
vary from roughly €3/ha in sparsely planted areas 
(scenario 4) to €9/ha in densely planted areas subject 
to more stringent regulations (scenario 7). Increasing 
the adoption rate lowers static per-hectare costs as the 
latter are amortized over a larger adopted area. Total 
static costs on the other hand follow an inverse U-
shaped curve with a maximum around an adoption rate 
of 50%, confirming that the latter represents the most 
stringent scenario of coexistence (cfr. supra). Halving 
(doubling) the oilseed rape planting density reduces 
(doubles) static costs to €3/ha (€8/ha). Doubling the 
required isolation distance has a marginal effect on 
costs, illustrating the static nature of these costs (cfr. 
infra). 
Table 1 suggests that static costs of rigid 
coexistence regulations are extremely sensitive to the 
incentives of coexistence, assuming that rational 
farmers compensate the lost GM rent with the IP rent 
(equation 1). Higher technology fees of GM seed lead 
to lower GM rents and hence lower static opportunity 
costs, ranging from €0.5 to roughly €2/ha. The 
opposite holds for lower technology fees (static costs 
of €5-17/ha). On the other hand, if IP price premiums 
rise, due to increasing demand for IP crops, static costs 
decline and become negative. If the IP rent is higher 
than the GM rent, farmers would not consider to plant 
GM crops and the coexistence issue would become 
irrelevant, stricto sensu. 
In our benchmark scenario, the break-even point is 
estimated at about 8%, i.e. if IP premiums rise above 
this level, coexistence costs are zero. However, under 
low IP premiums rigid coexistence regulations would 
still entail significant static costs in the range of €6 to 
€23/ha. In other words, if consumers do not express 
their preferences in the market, imposing rigid 
coexistence rules is costly for society because it denies 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008   5 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
farmers access to potentially cost-reducing 
technologies. These findings suggest that rigid 
coexistence regulations are not proportional to the 
farmers’ basic incentives for coexistence and hence 
not consistent with the objectives of the European 
Commission [1]. 
 
Table 1 Average costs of simulated rigid coexistence regulations under alternative scenarios. Areas and costs are averages, based on 10 
random allocations of GM and non-GM OSR fields. Standard deviations are shown between brackets. Theoretically, negative coexistence 
costs would not exist and be zero as rational actors would not consider planting GM crops when the IP rent is higher than the GM rent (last 
column). The domino-effect expresses the relative difference in per cent between the cumulative value in Phase 4 and the value in Phase 1. 














Scenario 1               
Phase 1  280  50%  81  4.05 (1.12)  0.73  7.36  10.08  -8.02 
Phase 2  199  36%  90  6.55 (2.26)  1.18  11.92  16.32  -12.99 
Phase 3  190  34%  91  6.99 (2.40)  1.26  12.72  17.42  -13.86 
Phase 4  189  34%  91  7.03 (2.38)  1.27  12.79  17.52  -13.94 
Domino -33%  -33%  +16%  +73%  (33%)  +73%  +73%  +73%  +73% 
Scenario 2              
Phase 1  137  25%  67  6.85 (1.89)  1.24  12.46  17.06  -13.58 
Phase 2  70  13%  70  15.74 (8.04)  2.84  28.64  39.21  -31.20 
Phase 3  67  12%  71  16.61 (8.14)  3.00  30.22  41.37  -32.92 
Phase 4  66  12%  71  16.78 (8.03)  3.03  30.54  41.81  -33.27 
Domino
  -52% -52% +9%  +136%  (55%)  +136%  +136%  +136%  +136% 
Scenario 3              
Phase 1  410  75%  77  2.64 (1.20)  0.48  4.79  6.56  -5.22 
Phase 2  333  61%  102  4.58 (2.86)  0.83  8.33  11.40  -9.07 
Phase 3  308  56%  106  5.30 (3.56)  0.96  9.65  13.21  -10.51 
Phase 4  303  55%  106  5.41 (3.69)  0.98  9.85  13.48  -10.73 
Domino
  -26% -26%  +41%  +96%  (59%)  +96%  +96%  +96%  +96% 
Scenario 4              
Phase 1  131  50%  24  2.52 (1.25)  0.45  4.58  6.27  -4.99 
Phase 2  107  41%  24  3.36 (2.07)  0.61  6.10  8.36  -6.65 
Phase 3  107  41%  24  3.39 (2.11)  0.61  6.16  8.44  -6.72 
Phase 4  107  41%  24  3.39 (2.11)  0.61  6.16  8.44  -6.72 
Domino
  -19% -19% +2%  +27%  (19%)  +27%  +27%  +27%  +27% 
Scenario 5              
Phase 1  548  50%  310  7.93 (1.12)  1.43  14.43  19.76  -15.72 
Phase 2  238  22%  357  22.00 (6.00)  3.97  40.03  54.81  -43.61 
Phase 3  191  17%  362  28.11 (7.93)  5.07  51.14  70.02  -55.72 
Phase 4  186  17%  362  28.70 (7.74)  5.18  52.22  71.50  -56.90 
Domino
  -66% -66%  +18%  +256%  (55%)  +256%  +256%  +256%  +256% 
Scenario 6               
Phase 1  280  50%  97  4.89 (1.16)  0.88  8.91  12.19  -9.70 
Phase 2  182  33%  117  9.39 (3.04)  1.69  17.08  23.38  -18.61 
Phase 3  162  29%  119  10.88 (3.89)  1.96  19.79  27.09  -21.56 
Phase 4  161  29%  119  11.01 (4.01)  1.99  20.04  27.44  -21.84 
Domino
  -42% -42%  +22%  +119%  (44%)  +119%  +119%  +119%  +119% 
Scenario 7               
Phase 1  548  50%  361  9.24 (1.07)  1.67  16.81  23.02  -18.32 
Phase 2  187  17%  411  32.42 (8.14)  5.85  59.00  80.77  -64.28 
Phase 3  136  12%  419  45.82 (12.13)  8.27  83.38  114.16  -90.84 
Phase 4  128  12%  420  48.47 (11.68)  8.75  88.19  120.74  -96.08 
Domino
  -77% -77%  +17%  +420%  (93%)  +420%  +420%  +420%  +420% 
 
The costs represented in the ‘Phase 1’ rows of Table 
1 reflect the static effect of rigid coexistence rules on 
initial adoption intentions. However, they are not 
stable as they exclude the possibility of a dynamic   6 
domino-effect, unleashed by subsequent conversions 
of local adoption intentions in the landscape and first 
described by Demont et al. [18]. Table 1 shows the 
successive GM area restrictions that emerge for 
potential adopters in densely planted areas by 
complying with stringent rules. Under scenarios 5 and 
7, for example, in a first phase a total area of 310-361 
ha is identified which conflicts with pre-existing 
oilseed rape fields and restricts deliberate adoption. If 
farmers plant these areas with non-GM oilseed rape in 
an attempt to capture the IP rent, they potentially 
create new distance conflicts with other potential 
adopters, cancelling about 47-50 ha in a second phase. 
This process is repeated until the isolation distances 
between all GM and non-GM oilseed rape fields are 
respected, i.e. after four phases in our example. In the 
first phase, static coexistence costs amount to €8-9/ha. 
However, the domino-effect raises these costs to €29-
48/ha, i.e. an increase of 256-420%, and restricts 
adoption to 12-17%.  
 
Table 2 Average costs of simulated flexible coexistence measures under alternative scenarios. Costs are averages, based on 10 random 
allocations of GM and non-GM OSR fields. Standard deviations are shown between brackets. 
        System 1 costs (€/ha)  System 2 costs (€/ha) 








1  50%  13%  10 m  0.35 (0.06)  0.28 (0.05)  0.42 (0.08)  0.26 (0.05)  0.13 (0.02)  0.52 (0.09) 
2  25%  13%  10 m  0.78 (0.24)  0.62 (0.19)  0.94 (0.29)  0.49 (0.19)  0.25 (0.10)  0.98 (0.38) 
3  75%  13%  10 m  0.22 (0.08)  0.17 (0.07)  0.26 (0.10)  0.20 (0.06)  0.10 (0.03)  0.39 (0.12) 
4  50%  6%  10 m  0.24 (0.15)  0.19 (0.12)  0.29 (0.19)  0.18 (0.12)  0.09 (0.06)  0.36 (0.23) 
5  50%  26%  10 m  0.84 (0.15)  0.67 (0.12)  1.01 (0.18)  0.63 (0.11)  0.31 (0.06)  1.26 (0.23) 
6  50%  13%  20 m  0.95 (0.15)  0.75 (0.12)  1.14 (0.18)  0.71 (0.11)  0.36 (0.06)  1.42 (0.23) 
7  50%  26%  20 m  2.22 (0.37)  1.76 (0.29)  2.68 (0.44)  1.66 (0.27)  0.83 (0.14)  3.33 (0.55) 
While the static relationship between the proportion 
of land available for GM crops and the isolation 
distance (e.g., in ‘Phase 1’ rows of Table 1) has been 
recognized in scholarly research on coexistence [9,10], 
the theoretical possibility of the domino-effect on 
adoption intentions has been ignored. In contrast to 
rigid coexistence regulations, costs of flexible 
coexistence measures are at most €3/ha (Table 2) and 
hence significantly lower than static and dynamic 
costs of rigid coexistence regulations. They display a 
similar sensitivity to adoption rates, but are 
significantly more affected by high planting densities 
and distance requirements. We also observe that costs 
of flexible coexistence measures are proportional to 
the incentives of coexistence. If there is limited 
demand for coexistence, reflected by low or inexistent 
market premiums, potential GM adopters have 
incentives to negotiate flexible coexistence measures 
with their neighbours. Under System 2, compensation 
payments for buffer zones are negligible, i.e. €0.1-
0.8/ha for IP premiums around 3%, and there is hardly 
any coexistence issue, stricto sensu. Rigid coexistence 
regulations on the other hand would still entail 
significant static costs of €6-23/ha (Table 1) by 
denying farmers access to cost-reducing technologies 
while they are not able to capture any significant 
compensatory IP rents. Moreover, a domino-effect 
may be unleashed in the landscape, further raising the 
dynamic costs of these regulations to €8-121/ha, and 
increasing their non-proportional character with 
respect to the incentives for coexistence. Due to the 
constrained randomization process, the variance of our 
cost estimates is low, reflected by the low standard 
deviations shown between brackets in Table 1 and 
Table 2. 
The domino-effect is also likely to occur in less 
densely planted areas, although less pronounced. If we 
halve the OSR planting density to 6% (scenario 4), the 
domino-effect boosts static coexistence costs by 27% 
(compared to 256-420% in our worst-case scenarios). 
The radius of action and intensity of the domino-effect 
are essentially a function of (i) the degree of land 
fragmentation, (ii) the planting density of OSR in the 
landscape, (iii) the legally required isolation distance, 
and (iv) the IP rent. Surprisingly, the domino-effect is 
not a direct function of the crop and the trait; it only 
depends on the latter to the extent that scientific 
evidence on crop-specific gene flow influences 
regulatory decisions on distance requirements. 
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Although we analyzed a specific case study of OSR 
cultivation in the Beauce Blésoise region in Central 
France, some general observations can be made. First, 
for any given degree of land fragmentation, planting 
density and isolation distance, our cost estimates can 
be easily extrapolated to other regions, other countries 
and even other crop-trait combinations by accounting 
for differences in prices, yields and GM and IP rents. 
Further research is needed to relate the domino-effect 
to an index of land fragmentation and to reproduce our 
methodology in other landscapes and for other GM 
crops/traits. Secondly, our coexistence cost estimates 
are based on hypothetical random allocations of crops 
in a given landscape and, hence, represent the most 
stringent scenarios of coexistence in the region. In this 
context, our estimated opportunity costs may be 
interpreted as upper limits. On the other hand, by 
analyzing a single season, we implicitly assumed that 
farmers comply with the modelled coexistence 
measures and that these measures are sufficient for 
maintaining seed purity and limiting the development 
of volunteers over time. This is a strong assumption 
and would lead to complex management measures and 
additional costs which are not considered here. 
Moreover, our cost estimates are purely based on 
opportunity costs and do not include transaction costs 
of implementing coexistence measures. However, we 
can reasonably assume that in reality GM and non-GM 
farmers would probably try to coordinate their crop 
allocations in time and in space and would take 
decisions that minimize transaction costs in the long 
run. All resulting non-random actions, such as, e.g., 
clustering, would tend to reduce total coexistence 
costs. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The trade-off between adopting GM varieties versus 
identity preservation of non-GM varieties will largely 
depend on the market signals stemming from 
consumer demand for non-GM crops. Only if 
consumers have (i) strong and sustainable preferences 
for non-GM crops and (ii) are willing to pay 
significant price premiums for them, will some 
farmers have an incentive to supply IP crops. If the 
opposite holds, there is no coexistence issue stricto 
sensu  and coexistence costs will purely reflect the 
costs of compliance to EU coexistence laws instead of 
the economic incentives for coexistence. 
So far, countries that grow significant area to GM 
crops have seen little premiums at the farm level. The 
price differentials for non-GM crops varied from 
almost zero (Brazil) to 1-3% in the USA and Canada 
[21]. Similarly, no price premium has emerged in 
international oilseed rape markets, but this might 
change if availability of non-GM supplies declines due 
to worldwide adoption of GM varieties [22-23]. 
However, if market signals for IP oilseed rape remain 
weak, incentives for agglomeration would be limited 
and rigid coexistence regulations would entail 
significant opportunity costs for potential adopters of 
GM varieties in a landscape with scattered non-GM 
fields. 
According to a recent Communication from the 
European Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, “[…] coexistence measures 
should not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
ensure that adventitious traces of GMOs stay below 
the labelling threshold […] in order to avoid any 
unnecessary burden for the operators concerned. 
While some Member States have taken this advice into 
account, others have decided to propose or adopt 
measures that aim to reduce adventitious presence of 
GMOs below this level. In some cases, proposed 
measures, such as isolation distances between GM and 
non-GM fields, appear to entail greater efforts for GM 
crop growers than necessary, which raises questions 
about the proportionality of certain measures. […] 
Given that the majority of Member States have not yet 
proposed technical field measures for coexistence, and 
that little practical experience is available, a full 
evaluation of such measures has not yet been possible. 
While the Commission recognizes the legitimate right 
to regulate the cultivation of GM crops in order to 
achieve coexistence, it stresses that any approach 
needs to be proportionate to the aim of achieving 
coexistence” [2, p. 6]. 
We developed a modelling framework for analyzing 
the farm level costs of managing spatial coexistence of 
GM and non-GM crops, which explicitly takes into 
account the incentives for coexistence, and applied it 
on the hypothetical case of GM oilseed rape 
cultivation in the Beauce Blésoise region in Central 
France. Our analysis shows that rigid regulations, such 
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as large isolation distances violate the proportionality 
condition and jeopardize the ability of farmers to 
adopt and utilize GM crops, due to the possibility of a 
dynamic domino-effect in the landscape. These 
empirical findings have been ignored in the current 
literature and are important for policy makers, as the 
debate on coexistence has been too often centred on 
costs instead of incentives. We show that flexible 
regulations are preferable since they are proportional 
to the incentives for coexistence and, hence, less 
counterproductive for European agriculture. 
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